主题：Disciplined Favoritism: Performance Driven Tax Incentives in China（约束性偏袒：中国基于企业绩效的税收激励机制）

主讲人：北京大学国家发展研究院 王轩助理教授

主持人：suncitygroup太阳新城官方网站 李昊楠副教授

时间：7月3日 16:00-17：30

地点：柳林校区格致楼918会议室

主办单位：suncitygroup太阳新城官方网站 科研处

主讲人简介：

王轩，北京大学国家发展研究院助理教授，2021年毕业于密歇根大学经济系。研究方向为公共经济学和应用微观经济学，侧重于税收问题与中国经济。他使用行政数据，研究税收激励如何影响企业与个人的行为，他也关心中国的税收征管问题，从而为制定更合理的税收政策提供依据。目前研究兴趣还包括中国的创新问题，评估公共政策对创新水平的影响。

内容提要：

We study how local governments in China use the enforcement of the corporate income tax to support their most economically important firms. Drawing on firm-level data from the National Tax Survey Database, we find that subnational governments lower effective tax rates for firms ranked highly within their own county not for the nationally largest firms--delivering the advantage through the discretionary components of tax administration: tax-base adjustments, exemptions, and enhanced deductions. The pattern is hard to attribute to confounders such as firms' tax-avoidance capacity, political connections, or policies aimed at attracting new entrants. Exploiting two quasi-experimental reforms--one that shifted the weight of growth in officials' evaluations, another that centralized audit authority--we show that the preferential treatment is driven by local leaders' growth incentives and made possible by their discretionary control over tax administration. Yet the favoritism is disciplined: the same local champions that enjoy lighter assessment are watched more closely, facing higher audit probabilities and harsher penalties, with scrutiny tightening when their contribution to the local economy falls. We term this configuration "disciplined favoritism" and argue that it offers a distinct view of state-business relations in China--one in which local governments build coalitions with productive firms through formal, performance-contingent fiscal instruments rather than informal deals.

本讲座研究中国地方政府如何通过企业所得税征管手段扶持本地经济支柱企业。基于全国税收调查数据库的企业微观数据，研究发现：地方市县政府仅为本县内经济地位靠前的企业降低实际税率，而非全国规模头部企业；地方政府借助税收征管中的自由裁量空间实现税收优待，具体方式包括税基调整、税收减免、加计扣除。该税收优待模式无法由企业避税能力、政企关联、招商引资类政策等混淆变量解释。研究利用两项准自然实验政策冲击——一项改革调整官员考核中经济增长指标权重，另一项改革实现税务稽查权限上收——实证表明，此类税收倾斜源于地方官员的经济增长激励，且依托地方政府对税收征管的自由裁量权得以落地。但这种偏袒存在约束机制：享受宽松征税待遇的本地重点企业，反而会受到更严密监管，面临更高税务稽查概率与更严厉处罚；一旦企业对地方经济贡献下滑，监管力度会进一步收紧。将这一治理模式定义为约束性偏袒，并提出该概念为理解中国政企关系提供全新视角：地方政府依托与企业绩效挂钩的规范化财税工具同优质企业建立利益协同，而非依靠非正式私下交易。